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INTRODUCTION
This Article examines the interaction between courts and legislatures
in developing the law that governs close corporations. Much has been
written analyzing whether corporate statutes are efficient. Others have
examined whether individual areas of corporate common law promote
efficiency.' I hope to gain a new purchase on these issues by examining
the interplay between these two sources of corporate law. A crude goal
of this Article is to begin an argument among three of the leading aca-
demic judges in the United States, who (listed in alphabetical order) are:
the Honorable Frank Easterbrook, Richard Posner, and Ralph Winter.2
At this crude level, the idea is fairly straightforward. Judge Posner
has suggested that common-law rules will tend to be efficient.3 While
Posner has not directly applied this theory to the common law of corpo-
rations, there is nothing in Posner's voluminous writings (that I have
been able to find) that would indicate that corporate common law should
be an exception to his general rule.
Judges Winter and Easterbrook, on the other hand, have suggested
that corporate statutes will tend to announce efficient law.4 This of
1. See, eg., Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40
Bus. LAW. 1437 (1985).
2. As opposed to the normal "let's-you-and-me-fight" form of scholarship, this article falls
more within the "let's-you-and-her-fight" genre. I recently co-authored a piece that pursues this
mode of analysis, suggesting that Judge Posner should argue with President George Bush about
what is really wrong with Title VII. Posner has argued that the prospect of firing liability may lead
employers not to hire women and minority workers; Bush argues that disparate-impact liability
leads employers to hire "quotas" of women and minority workers. An argument (or at least discus-
sion) between the two might clarify how the law should be changed-and might even lead to a
recognition that the Civil Rights'Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, is the appropriate
modification. See Ian Ayres & Joel Siegelman, Quotas Are Not the Problem (Aug. 18, 1991) (un-
published manuscript).
3. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986). While Posner has not
proposed a causal explanation for this tendency, other scholars (in a wonderful ongoing dialogue
published in the Journal of Legal Studies) have suggested that private parties will have more incen-
tives to relitigate inefficient rules-so that inefficient rules will be more likely overturned than effi-
cient rules. See Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977);
George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD.
65 (1977); John C. Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of the Common Law, 7 J. LEGAL
STUD. 393 (1978); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979); Robert Cooter & Lewis Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law
Without the Help of Judges?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1980).
4. Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation,
6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977); RALPH K. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION (1978);
Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J. L. & ECON. 23 (1983).
The dichotomy between Judge Posner and Judges Easterbrook and Winter is false, or at least
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss2/6
JUDGING CLOSE CORPORATIONS
course is the "race to the top" thesis-that competition among legisla-
tures for charter revenues will promote laws that maximize the share-
holders' value (and hence corporate value, because shareholders hold
residual claims on the corporate assets). The "race to the top" theory
responded to early theories of Professor William Cary and Justice Bran-
deis, which suggested that the competition among states engendered a
"race to the bottom."5 A great deal of academic writing has sought to
evaluate whether state legislatures are engaged in a race to the top or
bottom.6 Some articles have analyzed the substantive content of particu-
lar rules to assess whether statutory rules are consistent with the efficient
rules derived from economic theory.7 Other articles have empirically
tested whether businesses that incorporate in Delaware-the undisputed
leader of the race4-have higher or lower returns.9 It is striking that law-
and-economics scholars have argued that efficient legal rules can be gen-
erated by two powerful theories, yet to date no one has compared the
relative efficiency of the two theoretical engines themselves. 0
This Article begins to provide this comparison. By examining how
flimsy. Judge Posner is clearly a proponent of both the common-law-efficiency hypothesis and the
race-to-the-top hypothesis. Indeed, Posner has a claim to independent if not prior discovery of this
insight: page proofs of his Economic Analysis of Law (2d ed. 1977) contained a race-to-the-top
argument at the time when then-Professor Winter submitted his original article to the Journal of
Legal Studies.
5. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L..
663 (1974); Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 558-59 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (corporate race
not one of diligence but of laxity).
6. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent
Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 913 (1982); Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEx. L. REV.
469 (1987); Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw.
U. L. REV. 542, 585-91 (1990); Lucian Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable
Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 1992).
7. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and Public Opin-
ion, 57 U. CiN. L. REv. 457, 461-63 (1988).
8. "Over 40 percent of the companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange are incorpo-
rated in Delaware. A majority of the publicly traded Fortune 500 companies are Delaware corpora-
tions. More than 80 percent of the companies that have reincorporated during the past quarter
century have migrated to Delaware." R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DEL-
AWARE LAW Of CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, at F-1 (2d ed. 1990).
9. Professor Roberta Romano has the classic piece in this genre. Roberta Romano, Law as a
Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, I J. L. ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985).
10. Jack Coffee has written, however, an important work that suggests this comparison by ana-
lyzing the role of judges in interpreting statutory rules. John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1618 (1989).
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courts and legislatures react to each other's rules, I hope to gain insights
into the efficiency of the law. At a very basic level, the three judges can-
not be correct simultaneously if we see courts and legislatures fight with
each other. If both the common law and statutory law of corporations
are efficient, then we would not expect to observe such institutional ten-
sions. These tensions might take two forms:
(1) statutes might be drafted to overrule past judicial decisions and, pro-
spectively, to preempt courts' common-lawmaking power; and
(2) court decisions might explicitly or implicitly nullify statutory intent.1"
The existence of either type of tension is evidence against the proposition
that the two efficiency theories are both correct.
Indeed, the very existence of a statutory race is itself some evidence
that the common law was not getting the job done. 2 If, to use Professor
Romano's metaphor, the common-law legal product were being effi-
ciently produced, there would be no need for states to legislate. More-
over, if the common law were being efficiently produced in all
jurisdictions-as Posner's theory suggests it is in other substantive ar-
eas-there would be nothing for individual states to race over, because
there would be no legislative opportunity to become more red than the
common law rose."' Of course, for Posner's common-law efficiency the-
ory to stand, corporate common-law precedents must also change at an
efficient speed. There must be an efficient rate of product innovation.
But this is no more (or less) true in the corporate context than in the
other areas of common law in which Posner has waived the efficiency
banner. 14
11. Beyond the instances of outright nullification, the reluctance of common-law courts to fol.
low legislative intent is captured in the maxim of interpretation that "statutes in derogation of the
common law shall be narrowly construed." See Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204
U.S. 426, 437 (1907).
12. Romano has presented quantitative evidence to support a theory that at least some states,
such as Delaware, appear to be competing for corporate charters. See Romano, supra note 9 and
infra text accompanying note 19. Carey provides several qualitative pieces of evidence to the same
effect. Carey, supra note 5, passim.
13. This metaphor is taken from the communist argument that it was impossible to be "redder
than the rose"-that is, more progressive/revolutionary than the communist party itself. ROnERT
FORSYTHE, REDDER THAN THE ROSE (1935).
14. See, e.g., WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW (1987). Judge Posner has appreciated that legal efficiency must comprehend the dynam-
ically efficient rate of change. In a recent article, for example, he argued that Title VII might drive
bigots out of the employment market at an inefficiently high rate. Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency
and the Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 513 (1987). See also John J. Donohue III, Is Title
VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1411 (1986).
[Vol. 70:365
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Evidence of judicial and/or legislative nullification, however, cannot-
without more-tell who is wrong. Courts and legislatures might disagree
for three possible reasons:
(1) The common law is inefficient (i.e., Posner is wrong; Winter and Eas-
terbrook are right). Under this scenario, a "race to the top" would drive
legislators to overturn inefficient rules; or
(2) Statutory law is inefficient (i.e., Posner is right; Winter and Easter-
brook are wrong). Under this scenario, a "race to the bottom" would drive
legislators to overturn efficient common-law rules; or
(3) Both sources of law are inefficient (i.e., all three judges are wrong).
Under this scenario, both judge-made and legislature-made law deviate
from efficiency, but deviate in different ways-leading legislators to insist
(via legislative supremacy) on their brand of inefficiency.
This analysis of "nullification" provides only a single-tailed test of the
hypothesis that both the common and statutory law are efficient. Thus,
even if courts and legislators never disagreed, it would not prove that
both sources of law were efficient. Such evidence could be equally consis-
tent, for example, with the hypothesis that judges join the legislators in
racing to the bottom. This indeed was Professor Cary's original analysis
of Delaware (in which he stressed the close identity of interest between
judges and members of the Delaware legislature).15
While both efficiency theories have provided (and continue to provide)
an illuminating benchmark, many scholars believe that the tendency to-
ward efficiency is not strong enough for either to provide a very powerful
tool for predicting the contours of any individual legal rule. 6 For these
scholars at least, it comes as no surprise that courts and legislatures
sometimes disagree. Yet I would argue that an analysis of the judicial
and legislative interactions can do more than simply disprove the straw-
person theory that both judicial and statutory corporate rules are at all
times efficient.
The larger goals of this Article are two-fold. First, I hope to provide a
more subtle theory about the situations in which each institution is likely
to take the leading role in shaping a particular area of corporate law.
Second, I hope to show that the forces that lead to judicial or legislative
dominance can also inform our judgement about whether this particular
piece of corporate law enhances social welfare. The most important
framing force that determines the lawmaking roles of courts and legisla-
15. See Carey, supra note 5, at 688-92.
16. See, eg., STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987).
19921
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tures is the principle of legislative supremacy: when the institutions disa-
gree, the legislature wins. 17 Yet the ability and desire of legislators to
constrain common-law courts-either ex ante or ex post-will often de-
pend on other structural and contextual features that limit the legislators'
efficacy in monitoring their judicial agent. Courts also appreciate these
structural limitations and are likely to follow their common-law instincts
when there is less effective legislative supervision.
My specific thesis is that states competing for corporate charters do
not focus on the laws governing close corporations. Because states' reve-
nues are not particularly sensitive to the rules governing close corpora-
tions, state competition for close corporation charters will not be nearly
as intense as for publicly held corporations. In passing the "modern"
corporation statutes in the early years of this century, state legislatures
did not have the needs of close corporations in mind. Courts, for exam-
ple, were the first to see how the immutable statutory rules-especially
those regarding shareholder control agreements-were poorly tailored to
fit the governance of the close corporations."8
As a result, judges have exerted a much greater influence on the law
governing close corporations and, at times, have even shown a willing-
ness to openly nullify inefficient corporate statutes. The nullification of
certain Procrustean, immutable provisions by a few individual state
courts not only initiated a dialogue with the legislatures of those states,
but also conveyed information that motivated action by other state
legislatures.
Legislatures reacted to these judicial innovations primarily by codify-
ing the common-law rules. However, even absent competition for char-
ter revenues, legislatures may be motivated to act on behalf of well-
organized private groups, and at times close corporation statutes con-
-strain common-law trends to reflect these private interests. In sum, legis-
17. Unless, of course, the court's disagreement is based upon a constitutional principle that
itself is a form of legislative supremacy--because the court is giving primacy to a higher statutory
codification.
18. Bebchuk has forcefully argued for federalization of the discrete corporate rules when there
is a "race to the bottom." Bebchuk, supra note 6. My thesis suggests, however, that race-to-the
bottom stories do not justify federal preemption of close corporation governance for the simple rea-
son that states do not race for these charters. My argument that courts have mitigated the inefficien-
cies of statutes with regard to close corporations might offer some check on Bebchuk's race-to-the-
bottom arguments in other contexts. While not dispositive, we might choose not to bear the incffi-
ciencies of federalization if state courts can do a better job of "nullifying" legislation that is the
product of inefficient chartermongering.
[Vol. 70:365
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lative neglect of close corporations encouraged courts to alter rules that
were Pareto inefficient. The individual legislatures-not competing for
the close corporations' charters-have not been averse to adopting
Pareto superior rules, but in certain instances also have been willing to
sacrifice general social welfare for local private interests.
As the title suggests, this Article also can be viewed as an application
of the insights that my temporary dean, Guido Calabresi, originally for-
mulated in his seminal work A Common Law for the Age of Statutes.19
Calabresi argued that common-law courts should at times invalidate ob-
solete statutes that no longer served their initial function.20 My thesis
that state legislatures do not actively compete for close corporation char-
ters suggests that there would be greater legislative inertia to correct
flawed close corporation rules and that judges may legitimately scrutinize
these statutes more closely. The close corporation context also suggests
that the Calabresian method not only may describe judicial behavior re-
garding desuetude, but also may comprehend aspects of statutory over-
breadth when courts have a structural confidence that certain
applications were unintended.
Outside of Delaware's Chancery Court, there are no special state
courts for corporate issues, much less for close corporation litigation.
This Article argues, however, that judges deciding close corporation is-
sues act differently. Judges who normally would respect the strictures of
legislative supremacy have been willing to flout constitutional legislation
openly by nullifying successive generations of corporate statutes.
The Article is divided into three sections. The first Section details the
structural reasons states are not likely to compete for close corporation
charters. The remaining sections consider the role of courts and legisla-
tures in shaping two changing areas in the law of close corporations.
Section II analyzes the crucial role of courts in changing the immutable
requirement that ownership and control be separated. In Section III, I
discuss a variety of legislative responses to innovative judicial remedies
for deadlock and oppression.
19. GuIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
20. Id. at 163-66. Legislative supremacy could also affect the contours of this common-law
power. It is unclear, for example, in a Calabresian world whether courts should retain a power to
update obsolete statutes-regardless of whether the legislature has granted or denied them such a
power--or whether courts need an affirmative legislative grant of power for this type of updating.
1992]
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I. REVENUE INELASTICITY CONCERNING
CLOSE CORPORATION LAW
While "race to the bottom" and "race to the top" adherents disagree
on many issues, Roberta Romano saw that both camps do agree that
states like Delaware compete to maximize their revenues from corporate
charters.21 Starting with this basic premise, she then went out to look
whether a race was actually occurring. She showed, for example, that
Delaware's legislature was particularly responsive to legal innovations in
other states. 22 Moreover, she showed that states that earn a high propor-
tion of their state revenues from corporate franchise taxes were more
likely to adopt legislative innovations of other states.2 3 Romano's quali-
tative empiricism confirms the wealth of qualitative data William Cary
provided that indicates that Delaware actively seeks charter revenues.
This includes the legislature's explicit pronouncement: "[T]he favorable
climate which the state of Delaware had traditionally provided for corpo-
rations has been a leading source of revenue for the state.... The Gen-
eral Assembly . . . declares [this] to be the public policy of the
State.... "24 Thus, there is broad consensus from all sides that a primary
objective of states in drafting corporate statutes is to maximize franchise
revenues.
This Section argues, however, that this motivation does not govern
state provision of close corporation law.25 A state's tax revenues are rela-
tively insensitive to the substantive content of the laws governing close
corporations. Competitive federalism accordingly will not be a primary
determinant of close corporation statutes. Thus, whether one believes
that state competition leads to good or bad law, a prime thesis of this
Article is that interstate competition will not significantly motivate legis-
lative regulation of close corporations. In this competitive vacuum, I
21. Romano, supra note 9, at 233 ("The most fundamental postulate of both shareholder
wealth maximization and managerialist state competition stories is that states compete for incorpo-
rations by passing laws that the corporations' decisionmakers support.").
22. Id. at 240.
23. Id. at 239.
24. Act of Dec. 31, 1963, ch. 218, 54 Del. Laws 724 (authorizing the financing of the Delaware
Corporation Law Revision Commission of 1967), quoted in Carey, supra note 5, at 663.
25. This argument is consonant with the suggestion of Richard Posner and Ken Scott that
Delaware "has tailored its law to the needs of the large public corporation.... In short, the advan-
tages of a Delaware charter may outweigh the additional Delaware taxes only for businesses attain-
ing a certain scale of operations." RICHARD A. POSNER & KENNETH E. SCOTr, ECONOMICS OF
CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIEs REGULATION 111 (1980).
[Vol. 70:365
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suggest that close corporation statutes will be determined by the same
forces that drive many other types of legislative action: a desire to pro-
mote the public welfare, tempered by a willingness, at times, to cater to
well-organized private interests.
Legislators may also have preferences for leisure; my thesis that there
is relatively little (tax revenue) at stake suggests that elected officials may
not have large incentives to exert themselves in researching, drafting, and
passing the optimal legal rules. Given the likelihood of legislative indo-
lence, it is not surprising that we will find common-law judges taking a
greater lead in shaping the content of close corporate governance.
The one caveat to my thesis that state revenues are insensitive to close
corporation rules stems from the "perverse" use that states may make of
close corporation precedent. Some scholars have argued that Delaware
may have an advantage because it has a rich body of court decisions
applying its statutes.26 A state may have a revenue-based incentive to
force close corporations to abide by the rules governing publicly held
corporations to enhance the richness and depth of its precedent base.
Even though the legislatures know that the legal rules are not efficient for
closely held businesses, forced pooling of the close corporations under a
single statutory law may enhance a state's ability to compete for large
corporate charters. 27 I return to this argument below.
21
26. See, eg., Romano, supra note 9, at 280; Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of
Corporate Law, 89 CoLum. L. REv. 1549, 1566 n.56 (1989).
27. This argument is consistent with Michael Spence's generative insight that firms competing
for marginal sales may be driven to choose a product quality that the marginal consumer prefers. A.
Michael Spence, Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation, 6 BELL J. ECON. 417, 418 (1975). This choice
of quality may be socially inefficient if the average consumer's preferred quality diverges from the
preferences of the marginal consumer. Competition leads producers to ignore the quality prefer-
ences of average (or infra-marginal) consumers, because these consumers are capturing sufficient
gains from trade (consumer surplus) such that forcing them to buy inefficient quality will not deter
their purchases.
In this context, the close corporations are the infra-margina consumers of the states' legal "prod-
uct." States intent on maximizing revenue may have incentives to choose a quality (i.e., substantive
legal rules) that appeal more to the marginal consumers-the publicly held corporation. The prece-
dent story is similar to Spence's assumption that producing products with more than one quality is
costly. In the corporate context, doing so undermines the value of the precedent base.
28. As an empirical matter, it is also possible that close corporation interpretations of the stat-
ute may distort and hence undermine the value of precedent. Later in this Article, I show how
judicial nullification of general corporate statutes applied to close corporations may have produced
just this result. See infra text accompanying notes 95-97.
1992]
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A. Dominance of Domestic Domicile: Expenses Disproportionate to
Any Advantages Gained
Strong structural forces tie a small business' incorporation to the state
where it conducts most of its business. These forces are acknowledged in
no less than the definitive close corporation treatise by F. Hodge O'Neal
and Robert Thompson:
Almost invariably, domestic incorporation is preferable for a close corpora-
tion, especially for a small enterprise whose operations are to be limited to
one state. Incorporating a closely held enterprise in a state other than that
in which its principal place of business is to be located ordinarily involves
inconvenience and expense disproportionate to any advantages gained.2 9
Following O'Neal and Thompson's lead, this Section argues that there
are significant costs and limited advantages in nondomestic incorpora-
tion. Moreover, an examination of state tax schemes supports the thesis
that total charter revenues are unlikely to be very sensitive to changes in
laws governing close corporations.
L Additional Costs of Foreign Incorporation
A business incorporating in a jurisdiction where it does not conduct
business still must "qualify" to do business in the state where it actually
does conduct its business. Thus a double taxation not only occurs at the
time of initial registration, but also takes the form of annual fees that
must be paid to both states-one to remain qualified to do business as a
foreign corporation,30 the other to maintain corporate status in the for-
eign jurisdiction.31 For many publicy held corporations, qualification
fees are not duplicative. When these corporations conduct business in
multiple states, they already pay multiple qualification fees in the ordi-
nary course of their business operations.
Foreign corporations also must maintain a registered agent in the state
of incorporation. While this expense by itself would not deter foreign
incorporation by many closely held firms, the fear that the registered
agent might be used to receive process could act as a deterrent. This is
29. F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 2.11, at
55 (3d ed. 1987).
30. The dividends of foreign corporations are potentially taxed by both the states of commercial
and statutory domicile. See Romano, supra note 9, at 255 n.45; JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN, STATE
TAXATION S 9.3 (1983). But as Romano notes, "no jurisdiction apparently exercises this power."
Romano, supra note 9, at 255 n.45.
31. This discussion is based on the excellent treatment in O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 29,
§ 2.11, at 55.
[Vol. 70:365
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss2/6
JUDGING CLOSE CORPORATIONS
because a corporation can be sued in the state of incorporation. If the
foreign state is geographically distant from the corporation's base of op-
erations, the possibility of more expensive litigation might significantly
raise the expected cost of foreign incorporation. This potential expense
might not deter a closely held Philadelphia company from incorporating
in Delaware, but might substantially chill the similar interest of a small
Chicago business.32
Finally, foreign incorporation might substantially increase the com-
pany's costs of capital. The Securities Act of 1933 exempts issuers from
all registration and disclosure obligations under federal law when both
the issuer and the offerees are within the same state and when the pro-
ceeds are to be used in that state.3 3 This exemption is automatically for-
feited if the business incorporates in a state where it does not conduct
business. Registration and disclosure costs under the federal securities
laws can be substantial. 34 Thus, the intrastate-offering exemption might
provide a strong deterrent to foreign incorporation for those smaller
businesses that would benefit from the exemption.
2. The Limited Advantages of Foreign Incorporation
Most states permit corporations substantial contractual freedom and
thereby obviate the need for foreign incorporation. This argument re-
lates to Bernie Black's "triviality" hypothesis.35 Black argues that state
corporate law is trivial because "it does not prevent companies-manag-
ers and investors together-from establishing any set of governance rules
they want."31 6 Black explicitly argues that state laws granting corpora-
tions complete contractual freedom undermine the competition among
states for corporate charters: "The chartermongering race, whether to
the top, the bottom, or somewhere in between, is essentially over.",3 7
Whether this accurately describes the recent race to adopt antitakeover
amendments for the benefit of publicly traded corporations, the argu-
ment has particular force with regard to the specialized governance
structures of close corporations. Close corporations no longer have to
travel to fulfill their particular needs, because "the laws of most states are
32. Geographic distance may also increase the expected cost of being placed in receivership
because receivers can be appointed for a business in the state of incorporation. Id.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(1l) (1988).
34. See Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION (2d ed. 1988).
35. Black, supra note 6.
36. Id. at 544.
37. Id. at 586.
1992]
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sufficiently elastic to permit the setting up of almost any kind of capital
and management structures. 3 8
Finally, to the extent that a close corporation's domestic law is not
trivial, the advantages of incorporating elsewhere are reduced by a "you-
can-run-but-you-cannot-hide" effect. The internal affairs doctrine and
the dormant commerce clause notwithstanding, 39 some states impose
substantive rules of corporate governance on businesses that have sub-
stantial domestic contacts even if they are incorporated elsewhere.40 A
California statute, for example, imposes cumulative voting and other sub-
stantive laws on foreign corporations with specified ties to the state.41
New York's corporation statute subjects directors and officers of foreign
corporations to the same fiduciary standards as their counterparts in a
domestic corporation.42 A recent New York case underscores the diffi-
culty close corporations might have in contracting for another jurisdic-
tion's statute. In Application of Dohring,43 a New York court held that
New York courts could dissolve Delaware corporations under New York
statutory and common-law powers when the corporation's sole contact
with Delaware was its certificate of incorporation.' Especially to the
extent that the equitable power of domestic courts can govern a close
corporation's internal affairs, the competition for out-of-state charters
will be substantially impeded.
3. The Relative Insignificance of Close Corporation Revenues
From the available evidence, it seems that franchise fees paid by close
corporations represent only a small portion of the charter taxes corporate
America pays. Thus, while Delaware expects to earn 201 million dollars
in 1991 from its franchise tax rolls,45 only a small portion of this is likely
to come from close corporations. Thus, even if states could potentially
38. O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 29, § 2.11, at 56.
39. See generally Deborah A. DeMott, Perspectives on Choice of Law for Corporate Internal
Affairs, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161 (1985). See also Arden-Mayfair, Inc. v. Louart Corp.,
385 A.2d 3 (Del. Ch. 1978); Wilson v. Louisiana-Pacific Resources, Inc., 187 Cal. Rptr. 852 (Ct.
App. 1982) (California cumulative voting statute does not burden interstate commerce when Califor-
nia residents held more than half of Utah corporation's shares).
40. O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 29, § 2.11, at 55.
4.. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 1990).
42. N.Y. BUs. CORP. LAW § 1317 (McKinney 1986).
43. 537 N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
44. The implications of this case are discussed more fully infra at text accompanying note 101.
45. BNA Daily Report for Executives, State Developments DER No. 82, April 27, 1990, at
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compete for close corporation charters, their efforts to reap these low-
revenue incorporations are likely to be less than those to lure the publicly
held corporations that produce the bulk of a state's charter revenues.46
It is difficult to assess directly what proportion of corporate charters
come from close corporations, because states do not keep separate infor-
mation on the source of franchise funds. Yet some information can be
gleaned from a direct analysis of Delaware's franchise tax rates them-
selves. For example, a corporation with six thousand shares and fifteen
million dollars in total assets would pay fewer than fifty dollars a year as
franchise tax to Delaware,4' while most publicly listed corporations
would pay the maximum $130,000/year tax, or close to it.48
Although few businesses opt for statutory close corporation status,49
the large number of potentially qualifying close corporations probably
still does not represent a substantial source of state charter revenue. If
the sixteen thousand closely held corporations in Delaware paid the fifty
dollar annual franchise fee, the resulting eight hundred thousand dollars
in revenue would represent less than one third of one percent of Dela-
ware corporate tax receipts.
We can also gauge the insignificance of close corporation revenues by
imagining the potential revenues if all small businesses incorporated in
Delaware. There were approximately three million corporations in the
46. The market for corporate charters-like the market for cars-might generate highly con-
centrated profits when a small percentage of buyers produce a large proportion of a firm's (or state's)
profits. See Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations,
104 HARV. L. REV. 817, 854 (1991) (noting that car dealership profits tend to be concentrated in a
few sales).
47, This example is taken from BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 8, at 20-13 to 20-15. The
disparity between the size of the franchise tax for small and large corporations might work against
the previous analysis of the structural forces that tie the incorporation to the state in which the firm
primarily conducts business. If small corporations face significant switching costs, states might be
expected to exercise their effective market power by increasing the size of the franchise tax. The
response that the option of alternative forms of business organization (such as a limited partnership)
constrains states is only partially persuasive, since states could tax these alternative forms as well.
Political forces may keep a state from trying to exploit its own small businesspeople, and perhaps
discourage small business formation, by imposing heavy franchise fees on close corporations, most of
the shareholders of which will be residents of the state.
48. Corporations with more than 40 million authorized shares or assets worth a billion dollars
will pay the maximum tax of $130,000. Many publicly traded companies have substantially more
shares, for example (in millions of shares): Dow Chemical, 500; Kellogg Co., 165; Black and
Decker, 150; Warner Lambert, 300. See MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL (1991).
49. In 1985 only six-tenths of one percent of corporate franchises were statutory close corpora-
tions. Delaware and Maryland reported a total of 16,684 and 1100 statutory close corporations
respectively in recent years. O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 29, § 1.18.
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United States in 1983, and ninety-eight percent of these corporations had
total assets worth fewer than ten million dollars.5 0 If Delaware could
overcome the structural forces outlined above and monopolize the small
business charter market, it would not even double its revenues.5 1 In sum,
the structural forces that tie corporations to their state of primary busi-
ness52 and the relative insignificance of close corporation charter reve-
nues both support the notion that a state's franchise revenues are
unlikely to depend on changes in the rules governing close corporations.
Because states do not compete (or do not compete strenuously) for
close corporation charters, common-law courts have more freedom to
pursue their conception of the good. In the Sections that follow, I argue
that courts, true to Posner's efficiency hypothesis, have improved the law
of close corporations. Without the disciplining effect of competitive fed-
eralism, the legislative attitude toward close corporations has been pas-
sive. Legislatures have largely approved of common-law innovations as
long as the court decisions (1) do not adversely affect the states' quest for
publicly traded corporations, and (2) do not conflict with the legislative
demands of well-organized private interest groups.
II. UNDERMINING THE IMMUTABLE REQUIREMENT THAT
OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL BE SEPARATED: JUDICIAL
ENFORCEMENT OF SHAREHOLDER CONTROL
AGREEMENTS
A. The Immutable Separation: Herein McQuade v. Stoneham
The separation of ownership from control often has been characterized
as one of the fundamental attributes of the modern corporation.53 This
separation was caused not only by structural forces," but also by immu-
table statutory provisions mandating that "[t]he business of a corpora-
tion shall be managed by its board of directors." 5 Shareholder control
50. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1987, at 512-13 (1987).
51. At $50 per corporation, see supra text accompanying note 45, Delaware would increase its
revenues by less than $150 million. Its projected current franchise revenues are $201 million.
52. There are of course exceptions to this tendency. See, eg., Zion v. Kurtz, 405 N.E.2d 681
(N.Y. 1980); Application of Dohring, 537 N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
53. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1991); ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 1.2, at 22 (1986).
54. But see Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 10 (1991); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990).
55. N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 27, cited in Clark v. Dodge, 199 N.E. 641, 642 (N.Y. 1936). Over
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agreements that attempted to limit the discretion of the board of direc-
tors ran afoul of this and other statutory provisions56 and were routinely
voided by courts as being unenforceable in the early part of this cen-
tury." One of the best-known final statements of this rule came in Mc-
Quade v. Stoneham." In McQuade, the New York Court of Appeals in
1934 refused to enforce a shareholder control agreement in which the
shareholders agreed, inter alia, to "use their best endeavors" to have
themselves elected as officers of the corporation (and to pay certain sala-
ries). The court, even in reaffrming the traditional rule, signalled its
discomfort:
It is urged that we should pay heed to the morals and manners of the mar-
ketplace to sustain this agreement.... We do not close our eyes to the fact
that such agreements, tacitly or openly arrived at, are not uncommon, espe-
cially in close corporations.... Nor are we unmindful that McQuade has,
so the court has found, been shabbily treated as a purchaser of stock from
Stoneham .... [But] we are constrained by authority to hold that a contract
is illegal and void so far as it precludes the board of directors, at risk of
40 states required management "by" a board of directors. O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 29,
§ 5.06, at 24 n.2. See MODEL BusINEss CORP. AcT ANN. 759-61 (Committee on Corporate Laws
ed., 2d ed. 1971).
It is unclear whether this immutable rule was a codification of prior common law. See generally
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593
(1988); Christopher Grandy, New Jersey Corporate Chartermongering, 1875-1929,49 J. ECON. HIST.
677 (1989). An important question this Article does not address concerns the causes of this prior
common-law rule and whether the common law prior to statute adequately met the governance
needs of closely held corporations.
It is likely that the rise of close corporations in the 20th century might be caused by changes in the
tax system that caused closely held partnerships to incorporate. Thus, the early common law of
corporations-prior to the "modern" corporation statutes of the early 20th century-might not have
had to accomodate the governance demands of both large and small organizations.
56. According to O'Neal and Thompson:
Other statutes on which attacks on shareholders' agreements may be grounded include
those with provisions generally to the following effect: the directors shall be elected by a
plurality of votes cast by the shareholders; specified kinds of shareholder action (e.g., that
required for charter amendment or dissolution) shall be passed by stated percentages of the
stock vote; the shareholders shall be entitled to one vote for each share of stock held,
except to the extent otherwise provided in the corporation's charter; the shareholders shall
meet annually at a time and place fixed in the bylaws; the election of directors shall be by
ballot at a shareholders' meeting; directors shall be elected by cumulative voting; a director
shall be deemed qualified when he has filed a written acceptance and not before; a director
shall hold office until his successor is elected and qualified; and the officers shall be elected
by the directors.
O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 29, § 5.06, at 19 (footnotes omitted).
57. See, e.g., Nickolopoulos v. Sarantis, 141 A. 792 (N.J. 1928) (voiding shareholders' agree-
ment that violated statute mandating equal voting strength for each share).
58. 189 N.E. 234 (N.Y. 1934).
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incurring legal liability, from changing officers, salaries, or policies or re-
taining individuals in office, except by consent of the contracting parties.5 9
Even against strong pragmatic and equitable pressures, the Stoneham
court followed the mandate of the New York statute requiring that direc-
tors manage the business of the corporation.
Other courts did not find these statutory provisions as restrictive. As
one would expect,' when a statutory requirement seems anachronistic
both to business needs and to equity, courts will find interpretations that
allow relief. Thus, in the same year as Stoneham, the New York Court
of Appeals enforced a unanimous shareholder agreement providing for
cumulative voting, even though an amendment of the certificate of incor-
poration had not been filed (as required by statute).61 Other state courts
enforced shareholders' control agreements by ruling that conflicting stat-
utes were merely directory.62
B. Limited Nullification and the Statutory Response: Herein
Clark v. Dodge
In 1936, just two short years after McQuade, the New York Court of
Appeals took the lead in relaxing the immutable separation of ownership
and control. In Clark v. Dodge,63 Judge Crouch (who along with Judge
Lehman had concurred in McQuade's result, but who had rejected the
court's analysis of the statute) upheld the legality of a shareholder agree-
ment under which a minority shareholder was to continue as general
manager and director and was to receive one-fourth of the "net income"
of two corporations at issue.
The opinion is remarkable because it upholds the shareholder control
and compensation agreement, while at the same time openly admitting
that the agreement violates section 27 of the state's General Corporation
Law, which, as in other states, mandated "the business of a corporation
shall be managed by its board of directors." 6
59. Id. at 236-37.
60. See CALABRESI, supra note 19, at 2.
61. In re American Fibre Chair Seat Corp., 193 N.E. 253 (N.Y. 1934).
62. Clark v. Foster, 167 P. 908, 911 (Wash. 1917) (enforcing voting trust). See O'NEAL &
THOMPSON, supra note 29, § 5.06, at 22.
63. 199 N.E. 641 (N.Y. 1936).
64. Id. at 642. The Court applied the New York statute, even though the two corporations
were incorporated in New Jersey. Id. at 641. In its 1936 opinion, the Court did not address explic-
itly the choice-of-law issue. However, when Clark sought an order for specific performance of the
agreement in subsequent proceedings, the Dodge faction pleaded illegality under New Jersey law.
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Are we committed by the McQuade Case to the doctrine that there may be
no variation, however slight or innocuous, from the norm, where salaries or
policies or the retention of individuals in office are concerned? ... Public
policy, the intention of the Legislature, detriment to the corporation, are
phrases which in this connection mean little. Possible harm to bona fide
purchasers of stock or to creditors or to stockholding minorities have more
substance; but such harms are absent in many instances. If the enforcement
of a particular contract damages nobody-not even, in any perceptible de-
gree, the public-one sees no reason for holding it illegal, even though it im-
pinges slightly upon the broad provision of section 2Z 65
Clark openly flouts legislative supremacy. The court "sees no reason"
for upholding an agreement prohibited by statute-as if the statute were
not reason enough. Perhaps sensing the "lawless" basis for its holding,
the opinion attempts to cabin the reach of this common-law exception in
two ways. First, economists will have noted that it adopts a Pareto crite-
rion for statutory nullification. If ignoring a statute can make some peo-
ple better off without hurting anyone, the case for nullification is
strongest.66 Second, the Clark court seemed to limit enforcement to
shareholder agreements when the "invasion of the powers of the director-
ate.., is so slight as to be negligible."67
The official referee, observing that the Court of Appeals had noted the fact of New Jersey incorpora-
tion, applied New York law on the theory that the shareholders' agreement: (1) was a contract made
and delivered in New York by New York residents, and (2) was to be performed in New York by
corporations whose sole manufacturing plant and place of business was in New York. See supra
note 41 and accompanying text (discussing application of substantive law to internal affairs of for-
eign corporation).
65. 199 N.E. at 642 (emphasis added).
66. The use of the phrase "not even ... the public" in the italicized quotation is interesting-as
it suggests that consideration of the public good is an unusual judicial concern. Calabresi has re-
cently argued that this criterion would define a null set for nullification. Guido Calabresi, The Poin-
tlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211 (1991). If enforcing the contract
would not harm anyone in the least, there would not be two adversaries in this case, and the legisla-
ture would have already repealed the rule.
67. 199 N.E. at 643. Distinguishing McQuade, the court found:
There was no attempt to sterilize the board of directors, as in the Manson and McQuade
Cases. The only restrictions on Dodge were (a) that as a stockholder he should vote for
Clark as a director-a perfectly legal contract; (b) that as director he should continue
Clark as a general manager...; (c) that Clark should always receive as salary or dividends
one-fourth of the "net income" .. .; (d) that no salaries to other officers should be paid
unreasonable in amount or incommensurate with services rendered-a beneficial and not a
harmful agreement.
Id. It is difficult to see how these provisions distinguish Clark from McQuade. It may be true that
the agreement was "beneficial" but it does seem to be a significant "invasion of the powers of the
directorate." Indeed, Clark would not have entered the agreement if he had not believed that it
would significantly restrict the board's powers.
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The immutable rule of McQuade did not disappear immediately there-
after. New York opinions in the 1940s and early 1950s continued to
strike down shareholder agreements that impinged too significantly on
board discretion.6" Clark, however, sent an important signal to courts
and legislatures across the country.6 9 Most importantly, the New York
Legislature did not respond with hostility to the court's arguably lawless
action. Instead, it incorporated Clark's common-law rule. The 1961 re-
vision of the New York Business Corporation Statute contained a provi-
sion expressly allowing shareholder restriction of boards of directors.7"
The Revisers' comment made explicit that "Paragraph (b) expands the
ruling in Clark v. Dodge and, to the extent therein provided, overrules
... McQuade v. Stoneham."71
After Clark, increasing numbers of state courts and legislatures moved
to liberalize enforcement of shareholders' control agreements. The Kan-
sas Supreme Court held in 1953 that shareholders of close corporations
68. Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 77 N.E.2d 633 (N.Y. 1948);
Frieda Popkov Corp. v. Stack, 103 N.Y.S.2d 507, 509 (Sup. Ct. 1950) ("It is a fundamental principle
of the laws of this State governing corporations that the management and affairs of each corporation
are to be guided by the officers provided for or authorized in its charter. This management must be
separate and exclusive, and any arrangement by which control of the affairs of a corporation may be
taken from its stockholders and authorized officers and agents would be hostile and in opposition to
the established policy of our general corporation statutes .....
69. Professor Manne, however, has argued:
Legislative approval of small corporate norms developed long before the courts began to
reflect a more sympathetic approach. As early as 1901, for instance, state legislatures ap-
proved voting trusts which had earlier been declared illegal by courts because of the sepa-
ration of the vote from the underlying share interests.
Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 283
(1967) (citing General Corporation Act of 1901, ch. 167, § 18, 22 Del. Laws 286, 293). Manne's
argument shows only how the legislature allowed shareholders to contract for the election of direc.
tors. Prior to Clark, no legislation allowed shareholders to control the identity of officers or their
salaries--core separation issues.
70. Act of Apr. 24, 1961, ch. 855, § 620 (b), 1961 N.Y. Laws 2356, 2394-95. That provision
allows:
A provision in the certificate of incorporation otherwise prohibited by law as improperly
restrictive of the discretion of powers of the directors in their management of corporate
affairs ... shall nevertheless be valid: (1) If all the incorporators or holders of record...
have authorized such provision.. .; and (2) If... shares are transferred or... issued to
one who did not have knowledge thereof, and such person consents in writing to such
provision.
A 1948 amendment authorized charter provisions fixing higher votes and quorums for shareholder
and director actions in a response to the close corporation needs. Act of Apr. 6, 1948, ch. 862, Sec.
1, § 9, 1948 N.Y. Laws 1704. This statutory section has been superseded. See N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW §§ 616 & 709 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1991).
71. Zion v. Kurtz, 405 N.E.2d 681, 686 (N.Y. 1980).
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could waive statutory rights by contract.72 In 1955 the Delaware Chan-
cery Court struck down a "sterilizing" shareholders' agreement but inti-
mated that less intrusive agreements with unanimous shareholder
approval might be enforced.7 3 In the late 1950s and early 1960s, three
other states (South Carolina, Connecticut, and North Carolina) joined
New York in expanding the rights of shareholders in close corporations
to contract for control. While both covert and explicit judicial nullifica-
tion initiated the process, by the mid-1960s there appeared to be a legisla-
tive recognition that the shareholders of close corporations needed a
broader freedom of contract.74
C. Expanded Nullification in Galler and Zion
Even in the midst of the statutory reform movement, courts continued
to play a crucial role in moving the law. In 1964, the Illinois Supreme
Court in Galler v. Galler 75 granted specific performance of a sharehold-
ers' agreement providing for salary and dividend payments to the share-
holders as well as their families. The court's enforcement again
contradicted an Illinois statutory requirement that "[t]he business and
affairs of a corporation shall be managed by a board of directors. '76 The
Galler opinion quoted Clark's Pareto standard for nullification, but
seemed to go beyond Clark to find that shareholder control agreements
in close corporations would be upheld without regard to the degree of
board sterilization.77 Like Clark, the opinion is remarkable for the open-
72. Peck v. Horst, 264 P.2d 888 (Kan. 1953), decision adhered to on reh'g, 272 P.2d 1061 (Kan.
1954). Dean (now Judge) James Logan, in parsing the opinion, concluded that the decision "would
seem to establish that in Kansas the owners can do as they wish on any or all management ques-
tions." James K. Logan, Methods to Control the Closely Held Kansas Corporation, 7 KAN. L. REv.
405, 431 (1959).
73. Abercrombie v. Davies, 123 A.2d 893 (Del. Ch.) ("our corporation law does not permit
actions or agreements by stockholders which would take all power from the board to handle matters
of substantial management policy. This is particularly true absent 100% stockholder approval....
Even unanimous stockholder actions in this field has its limitations."), modified, 125 A.2d 588 (Del.
Ch. 1956), rey'd on other grounds, 130 A.2d 338 (Del. 1957).
74. See Ernest L. Folk III, Corporation Statutes. 1959-1966, 1966 DUKE L.J. 875, 946-57.
75. 203 N.E.2d 577 (Ill. 1964).
76. Business Corporation Act of 1933, § 157.33, 1933 Ill. Laws 308 § 33 (current version at
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, para. 8.05 (1985)).
77. Eight years later, in Somers v. AAA Temporary Services, Inc., 284 N.E.2d 462 (Ill App.
Ct. 1972), an appellate court rejected an argument that Caller permitted a shareholders' agreement
to amend the by-laws to be enforced despite contrary statutory language-and in doing so seemed to
return to a Clark-like standard: "Slight deviations from corporate norms may be permitted. How-
ever, action by the shareholders which is in direct contravention of the statute cannot be allowed."
Id. at 465.
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ness with which it discusses common-law nullification:
[T]here has been a definite, albeit inarticulate, trend toward eventual judi-
cial treatment of the close corporation as sui generis. Several shareholder-
director agreements that have technically "violated" the letter of the Busi-
ness Corporation Act have nevertheless been upheld in the light of the ex-
isting practical circumstances, i.e. no apparent public injury, the absence of
a complaining minority interest, and no apparent prejudice to creditors.78
Galler is an opinion that Guido Calabresi must love. This common-law
court sensed the clear failure of the statute and spoke candidly about the
covert judicial trend. Citing a growing consensus among scholars7 9 and
explicitly recognizing the statutory trend toward enforcement in other
states,80 the court casts itself as initiating a dialogue-very much in
Calabresian terms:
Perhaps, as has been vociferously advanced, a separate comprehensive stat-
utory scheme governing the close corporation would best serve here.... At
any rate, however, the courts can no longer fail to expressly distinguish
between the close and public-issue corporation when confronted with
problems relating to either. What we do here is to illuminate this problem-
before the bench, corporate bar, and the legislature, in the context of a par-
ticular fact situation. To do less would be to shirk our responsibility, to do
more would perhaps be to invade the province of the legislative branch.8 '
More than just the Illinois Legislature heard this signal. In 1966, the
Model Business Corporation Act was revised to allow certain contractual
options for enhanced shareholder control.82 More importantly, it was
not until 1967 that Delaware-the quintessential charter competitor-
finally was motivated to add special statutory provisions for close
corporations.8
3
78. 203 N.E.2d at 584.
79. See eg., George D. Hornstein, Stockholders' Agreements in the Closely Held Corporation,
59 YALE L.J. 1040 (1950); Note, A Plea for Separate Statutory Treatment of the Close Corporation,
33 N.Y.U. L. REV. 700 (1958), cited in Galler, 203 N.E.2d at 585.
In making a structural argument about the force of the law, I should not be heard to have said
that individuals do not make a difference. Corporate scholars also played key roles in affecting the
content of legislation. Professor Latty seems to have played a key role in the 1955 North Carolina
statute; Professor Folk is responsible for the South Carolina statute; more recently Professor Carney
has influenced the content of the Georgia corporate statute. William J. Carney, Changes in Corpo-
rate Practice Under Georgia's New Business Corporation Code, 40 MERCER L. REV. 655 (1989).
80. 203 N.E.2d at 585.
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. Folk, supra note 74, at 946 n.408.
83. General Corporation Law, ch. 50, 56 Del. Laws 151 (1967) (redrafting tit. 8, ch. 1 of the
Delaware Code, to add, inter alia, subch. 14-Close Corporations; Special Provisions to the Code).
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341-56 (1983).
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It is surprising, however, that Judge Easterbrook and Dan Fischel
have praised this opinion. In an important analysis of close corporation
law published in the Stanford Law Review, 4 these strong advocates of
the race-to-the-top theory 5 heap scorn on McQuade, calling it "a fossil"
and praising the judicial nullification of corporate statutes in both Clark
and Galler. 6 Yet from the race-to-the-top perspective, if the legislatures
are getting it right, how can nullifying judicial opinions be praiseworthy?
This modest conundrum is resolved, I hope, by my thesis that the
states were not racing for close corporation charters. As previously sug-
gested by O'Neal and Thompson,
[T]he norms in the corporation statutes were designed largely to protect
shareholders and investors in publicly held corporations where there is a
separation of management from ownership and a very real danger to the
investing public. In all probability, the legislatures in enacting these norms
did not think of close corporations at all. 8 7
The preoccupation of state legislatures with "domesticating" publicly
held corporations undermines judicial confidence that the breadth of the
statutory language had been adequately considered. Moreover, it was
likely that there would be greater legislative inertia toward correcting
provisions that had unforeseen and wrongheaded consequences for close
corporations. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that legis-
latures might get it wrong (and leave it wrong) 8 and that courts might
feel more comfortable taking a more activist common-law stance. Yet
given the Galler court's recognition that other state legislatures had over-
come their inertia and recently adopted expansive close corporation pro-
visions, the result in Galler is normatively harder to accept. In contrast
to Clark, the Galler court might have been able to send a message to the
Illinois Legislature that its corporations act was out of date without abro-
gating the terms of a constitutional statute.
Judicial nullification, moreover, has not been limited to Galler's pur-
84. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN.
L. REV. 271 (1986). This article is included in a wonderful collection of the authors' writings. The
book provides a definitive statement of the nexus-of-contracts view of corporations. See Ian Ayres,
Book Review, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. (forthcoming 1992) (reviewing FRANK H. EASTERBROOK &
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991)).
85. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 4; Fischel, supra note 6.
86. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 84, at 281-82.
87. O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 29, § 5.06, at 20.
88. Yet even here it is possible, as I suggested earlier, supra text accompanying note 24, that
legislatures intentionally sought to enslave close corporations to inefficient corporate rules to gener-
ate a richer precedent base.
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ported signalling function. In Zion v. Kurtz, 9 Delaware statutory re-
quirements for close corporation governance were nullified, even though
the Delaware Legislature had passed an enabling close corporation stat-
ute.9" Although the general Delaware statute still vested the board of
directors with authority to direct the affairs of the corporation,9" a 1967
amendment allowed shareholders in a close corporation to agree to re-
strict directors' powers if they recorded these restrictions in the articles
of incorporation.92 Zion held that an agreement prohibiting the conduct
of corporate business without the consent of the minority shareholder
was enforceable even though the agreement had not been incorporated in
the corporation's charter.93
I would argue that the nullification in Zion is normatively even less
reasonable. When a legislature has recently updated an outmoded stat-
ute and has specifically addressed itself to the context at issue, the
Calabresian rationale for common-law "updating" is much weaker. 9a
More important, I would like to propose a descriptive theory of why the
legislature imposed the procedural requirement that corporations explic-
itly opt for close corporation status and for its accompanying judicial
treatment.
As I argued above, the legislature might have been motivated to apply
an immutable separation of ownership and control rule to produce a
larger base of precedents and hence to gain an advantage in
chartermongering. The benefits of this forced pooling, however, would
have been significantly impaired by the increasing tendency of common-
law courts to bend if not break the statutory rules. This common-law
tendency and the resultant deleterious effect on publicly traded corpora-
tions are discussed once again with great candor in the Galler decision.
After cataloging the "definite, albeit inarticulate, trend" toward sui
generis treatment of close corporations, the decision concluded:
89. 405 N.E.2d 681 (N.Y. 1980).
90. It may be significant that a New York court nullified the Delaware statute. Cf Clark v.
Dodge, 199 N.E. 641 (N.Y. 1936) (New York court improperly applies New York law to New Jersey
corporation).
91. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1983).
92. General Corporation Law, ch. 50, § 350, 56 Del. Laws 151, 247 (1967).
93. 405 N.E.2d at 685.
94. O'Neal and Thompson's normative assertion that "[c]ourts and legislatures which have not
already done so should hasten to repudiate [McQuade-type] decisions," O'NEAL & THOMPSON,
supra note 29, § 5.06, at 20, is similarly overbroad. While there are strong reasons for statutory
recision of the immutable prohibition of shareholder management, the appropriateness of court repu-
diation--even within the Calabresian framework-turns in part on the degree of legislative inertia.
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[W]e have thus far not attempted to limit these decisions as applicable only
to close corporations and have seemingly implied that general considera-
tions regarding judicial supervision of all corporate behavior apply.
The practical result of this series of cases, while liberally giving legal effi-
cacy to particular agreements in special circumstances notwithstanding lit-
eral "violations" of statutory corporate law, has been to inject much doubt
and uncertainty into the thinking of the bench and corporate bar of Illinois
concerning shareholder agreements. 9"
The uncertainty described in this quotation gives rise to a less altruistic
motive on the part of legislators who moved to pass special close corpo-
ration provisions. Even without competitive federalism, legislatures
often promulgate public-regarding rules9-especially when the rule
change (as the Clark opinion suggested) could pass the Pareto criterion.
Yet the Galler opinion, while citing Clark, also suggests a reason judicial
nullification in both cases might not have wrought a Pareto
improvement.
Simply stated, judicial nullification of a general corporate statute for
the benefit of closely held corporations might have spillover effects that
reduce a statute's certainty and therefore its value for publicly traded
corporations. Legislatures might have decided it would be easier to
channel close corporations into a different classification and treatment
scheme so that judicial nullification would not reduce the desirability of a
state's statute for publicly traded corporations. This theory suggests
that, although states may not compete for close corporation charters,
states will have competitive concerns about the close corporation rules to
the extent to which these rules have spillover effects for publicly traded
charters. The theory also predicts that Zion-type nullifications are more
likely to be overturned by legislation reiterating the procedural
requirements.
In sum, the judicial opinions in Clark, Galler, and Zion played leading
roles in changing the immutable rule prohibiting shareholder manage-
ment to a mere default for close corporations. 97 Because legislatures do
95. 203 N.E.2d at 584.
96. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 14.
97. Under Clark's Pareto criterion, it is difficult to understand why publicly held corporations
are not given the option of contracting for restrictions of management power. See DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 141(a) (1983). While powerful structural forces may eliminate the demand for these provi-
sions, unanimous assent to such a restriction under Clark's rationale would not seem to injure any-
one. O'Neal and Thompson have suggested that "investors in a publicly held corporation ... play
no part in preparing the charter or bylaws which set up the organization or structure of the corpora-
tion and... therefore may need the protection afforded by statutory norms." O'NEAL & THOMP-
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not compete for close corporation charters, courts exercised greater dis-
cretion in interpreting and at times nullifying or updating unnecessary
restrictions on the freedom of contract for close corporation sharehold-
ers. By now, legislatures have largely codified these early nullifications,
both to improve the law for locally domiciled close corporations and to
reduce the deleterious spillover effects that judicial nullifications might
have had on the competition for the charters of publicly held
corporations.
III. LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT OF EQUITABLE REMEDIES
FOR OPPRESSION
This Section considers a legal question that has no obvious answer
based on principles of efficiency: What legal rights to exit a close corpo-
ration should a minority shareholder have in the absence of a specific
contract? In contrast to the strong Pareto argument that close corpora-
tion shareholders should be able to contract for control, it is much more
difficult to divine what default contractual rights courts should give mi-
nority shareholders in cases of deadlock or oppression. Because it is a
close issue, it is not surprising that courts and legislatures have evolved a
variety of different standards, which at varying times lead courts to be
more or less willing than legislators to protect minority shareholders'
rights. My thesis is that, as before, looking at the interaction between
these institutions--especially the tensions or divergent views-can yield
insights about how efficient law might be structured.
The corporate statutes of most states give minority shareholders only
limited opportunities to exit. As Easterbrook and Fischel have
summarized:
Statutes typically require either a deadlock that makes operation of the
business impossible or some form of serious misconduct by those in control.
The Model Act, for example, authorizes involuntary dissolution if deadlock
causes "irreparable injury" or if those in control "have or will have acted in
a manner that is illegal, oppressive, fraudulent or unfairly prejudicial" to
the complaining shareholder. 98
It is significant that Delaware's statute does not address the issue. In
SON, supra note 29, § 5.06, at 21. If this explanation is only compelling, it suggests that the
corporate contract may not further shareholders' interests-leading legislatures to the race-to-the-
bottom theory.
98. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 84, at 286.
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Delaware there is thus no statutory guarantee of involuntary dissolution
even under the extreme Model Act conditions.
The courts' reaction to these limiting statutes has been quite diverse-
including not only various forms of judicial gap filling, but arguably both
liberalizing and constraining forms of statutory nullification. Easter-
brook and Fischel, for example, have noted:
Even where the relevant statutory criteria [for oppression] arguably have
been met, courts have been reluctant to grant involuntary dissolution. In In
re Radom & Neidorff, Inc., [119 N.E.2d 563 (N.Y. 1964)] to take one well
known example, the court declined to dissolve a profitable firm at the re-
quest of one of two equal shareholders, even though the other refused to
sign salary checks and did not to [sic] contribute to the running of the
business. 99
These authors then go on to provide an efficiency explanation for these
judicial opinions. But as an initial matter, it is surprising to see strong
proponents of statutory efficiency going out of their way to praise judicial
nullification. Why are they not compelled by their own process argu-
ments to accept that the statute is more likely to be "right" than the
judges? Again, this seeming inconsistency is explained by the authors'
implicit acceptance that the race-to-the-top theory does not necessarily
apply here. too We just do not have the same procedural confidence that
corporate statutes concerning close corporation governance are going to
be efficient.
Easterbrook and Fischel's substantive rationalization for what I am
calling a form of judicial nullification is also illuminating:
99. Id. (footnote omitted). For other cases similarly "nullifying" statutory conditions for invol-
untary dissolution, see Kruger v. Gerth, 210 N.E.2d 355 (N.Y. 1965); Polikoffv. Dole & Clark Bldg.
Corp., 184 N.E.2d 792 (Ill. App. Ct. 1962); Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387
(Or. 1973).
100. Writing for the majority, Judge Desmond refused dissolution at least in part because the
firm was prosperous. The New York legislature shortly thereafter amended its corporate statute to
overrule this part of the Radom holding. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1111(b)(3) (McKinney 1986)
("[D]issolution is not to be denied merely because it is found that the corporate business has been or
could be conducted at a profit.").
The New York legislature similarly overruled Judge Desmond's holding that bylaws requiring
unanimity for shareholder and director action in a close corporation were invalid because of a public
policy requiring majority rule. Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, 60 N.E.2d 829 (N.Y. 1945). See N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 613 (McKinney 1986). Easterbrook and Fischel do not address whether these
exercises of legislative supremacy in nullifying the common-law holdings enhance efficiency. Pre-
sumably they would argue that the legislature erred in overruling Radom but not in overruling
Benintendi. But it is hard to make out a causal theory for the institutional behavior. I am indebted
to John Hetherington for bringing this point to my attention.
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The right to call on a judge may undermine the specificity of the property
right because the parties must predict how a judge will decide. The more
trouble they have predicting, the less likely they are to resolve their differ-
ences short of litigation, even when there are only two parties. In short, the
parties may want to make deadlock costly (so there will be less of it) and to
keep the courts out when deadlock occurs (so they can settle their own
disputes).101
In a sense, the legal issue concerns the appropriate protection for the
majority's entitlement to the minority's continued participation in the
corporation. Denying minorities an opportunity for judicial exit
(through involuntary dissolution or a buyout) protects the majority's en-
titlement with a property rule; allowing minorities to petition for exit
under various conditions protects the majority's entitlement with some-
thing more akin to what Calabresi and Melamed have termed a liability
rule.10 2 But to see the issue in terms of a choice between a property rule
and a liability rule is only to emphasize the difficulty in identifying the
optimal amount of entitlement protection. As Calabresi and Melamed
elegantly argued, property-rule protections induce higher bargaining
costs, while liability-rule protections induce higher litigation costs. Espe-
cially in contractual settings, there often will be a close "horse race" to
determine the least-cost form of protection.103 As Easterbrook and Fis-
chel indicate, the parties ex ante "may... want to keep the courts out
when deadlock occurs"-but, then again, they may not.1°4 The decision
101. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 83, at 287. Judge Posner published a similar analysis of
Radom in 1986. POSNER, supra note 3, at 399-400.
102. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inaliena-
bility: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). I realize that by citing the signer
of my paycheck repeatedly in the same article, I am likely to subject myself to sustained conflict-of-
interest criticism. I confess that I have recently gone even further by titling an entire policy section
after yet another one of his books. See IAN AYRES ET AL., UNEQUAL RACIAL ACCESS TO KIDNEY
TRANSPLANTATION (Stanford Law & Economics Working Paper No. 85, 1991) (citing repeatedly
GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBImr, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978)).
103. The corporate opportunities doctrine also reflects a choice between property and liability
rules. For example, if courts say that officers must not seize opportunities even when the corpora-
tion is not capable of exploiting them, then a property rule protects the corporation's entitlement. If
the officers do not need to bargain to exploit this opportunity, then the corporation's entitlement has
at best a liability protection. Cf. Miller v. Miller, 222 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 1974); Klinicki v. Lund-
gren, 695 P.2d 906 (Or. 1985) (en banc).
104. That property-rule protections encourage additional explicit bargaining suggests that prop-
erty rules may at times be a species of "penalty defaults" or information-forcing rules that, by en-
couraging parties to contract around the original entitlements, reveal information to the courts or to
the parties to the contract. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). See also Easterbrook & Fischel,
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whether and under what conditions to allow minority exit, unlike the
immutable prohibition of shareholder agreements, is not a choice be-
tween a Pareto inferior and Pareto superior rule.
Given the difficulty of identifying the efficient rule, it is not surprising
that there have been other judicial and legislative responses to the prob-
lem. In some jurisdictions, courts, instead of refusing to grant dissolu-
tion in the case of oppression, have increasingly fashioned alternative
forms of relief for minority shareholders based on the courts' inherent
equitable power.0 5 In contrast to Neidorff 's nullification against the mi-
nority interest, the judicial desire to allow minority exit has increasingly
led judges to "nullify" statutes to benefit minority interests. For exam-
ple, in Application of Dohring,t° a New York court "lawlessly" violated
the internal affairs doctrine by applying New York statutory and com-
mon law to a Delaware corporation to allow dissolution. 10 7
As an alternative to involuntary dissolution, several state statutes (and
the Revised Model Business Corporation Act) 10 give the corporation
and/or the majority shareholders a "majority call" option to buyout the
minority shareholders upon a showing of oppression. These new judi-
cially crafted remedies, however, grant minority shareholders an option
to sell their shares back to the corporation (a "minority put" option). 109
The equitable remedy of a judicial put has been seen "as a less harsh
remedy" than involuntary dissolution because it is less likely to sacrifice
the corporation's value as an ongoing business. 110 Courts accordingly
are more likely to find majority oppression and grant relief when the
supra note 83, at 287 ("Restrictive legal rules concerning involuntary dissolution also create incen-
tives for the parties to establish less expensive methods of adjusting conflicting interests.").
105. See, eg., Belcher v. Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank, 348 F. Supp. 61 (N.D. Ala. 1968) (Ala-
bama law); Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (Pennsylvania law), aff'd, 802
F.2d 448 (3d Cir. 1986); Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270 (Alaska 1980).
106. 537 N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
107. The court suggested that under its broad equitable powers it could dissolve a foreign corpo-
ration when the corporation's sole contact with the foreign state was its corporate registration and
when most of the corporation's assets, employees, offices, operations, and two of its five directors
were in New York. Id.
108. REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 14.30(2) (1991).
109. See, e.g., In re Wiedy's Furniture Clearance Ctr. Co., 487 N.Y.S.2d 901 (App. Div. 1985);
McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Son, Inc., 724 P.2d 232 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986); Davis v. Sheerin, 754
S.W.2d 375, 380 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988). But see Corlett, Killian, Hardeman, McIntosh & Levi, P.A.
v. Merritt, 478 So. 2d 828 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
110. F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORrrY
SHAREHOLDERS § 7.20 (2d ed. 1985, 1991 revision).
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remedy is socially less costly.11'
Yet even in this equitable setting, the corporate statute often provides
an important frame. In several instances, courts use the statutory
grounds for involuntary dissolution as the basis for granting the minority
put.1 2 Conversely, some courts have shown reluctance to exercise their
inherent equitable powers to grant relief (including minority puts) with-
out a statute establishing some minority cause of action.1 3 Finally, Vir-
ginia decisions have held that the presence of a statutory dissolution
remedy is exclusive and preempts the courts' exercise of any general eq-
uitable power.'14
While some state legislatures have joined the judicial trend toward
granting minorities exit alternatives other than involuntary dissolu-
tion, 11 the majority of statutes-including Delaware's-still do not au-
thorize alternative forms of exit such as the minority put. Moreover,
North Carolina, which since 1955 had statutory authorization for a mi-
nority put and for other forms of equitable relief, has recently revised its
statute to limit courts' power to grant these exit options.11
6
I would like to contrast two alternative explanations for these diverse,
but still divergent, institutional reactions-i.e., in instances of majority
oppression, courts are more likely than legislatures to authorize minority
puts. The first explanation suggests that the courts' concern with ex post
equity might make the judiciary the less efficient creator of legal rules.
The courts' increasing willingness to find oppression and grant minority
puts might grow out of their ex post concerns both for equities and for
the seeming inefficiency of wasting assets. As Easterbrook and Fischel
argued, however, it is possible that dynamic efficiency is better founded
on ex ante incentives for ex ante contracting. If the North Carolina Leg-
111. Id. ("The recognition of the possibility of buyout as a less drastic remedy undoubtedly has
contributed to the breakdown in the traditional judicial and legislative resistance to granting relief
where there is dissension among shareholders.").
'112. Maddox v. Norman, 669 P.2d 230 (Mont. 1983); Delaney v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 564
P.2d 277 (Or. 1977).
113. See O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 110, § 7.11.
114. See Giannotti v. Hamway, 387 S.E.2d 725 (Va. 1990); White v. Perkins, 189 S.E.2d 315
(Va. 1972).
115. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-216 (1990); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, para. 12.55
(1991); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 1123 (West 1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1489 (1990).
116. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-14-30 & 55-14-31 (1990) (replaced N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125.1,
which authorized minority put). For an excellent discussion of the revision, see Robert S. McLean,
Note, Minority Shareholders' Rights in the Close Corporation Under the New North Carolina Business
Corporation Act, 68 N.C. L. REv. 1109 (1990).
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islature believed that the courts were granting minority shareholders puts
too often or for inappropriate valuations, concerns with ex ante efficiency
might lead it to limit courts to the former all-or-nothing choice of
dissolution.
An alternative explanation, however, turns on the relative inefficiency
of legislatures in crafting rules of close corporation governance. I should
stress that this alternative hypothesis is extremely tentative-and is pro-
posed primarily to provoke further empiricism. This alternative grows
out of the foregoing procedural argument that states will have weak in-
centives to compete for close corporation charters. In the absence of
competitive federalism, the legislative process is likely to be influenced by
a variety of factors-but in particular by concentrated private interest
groups that can lobby for self-interested legislation.117
In the close corporation setting, the majority shareholders are likely to
be residents of the incorporating state and are likely to have particular
lobbying power. As a result, an additional influence on close corporation
statutes will be the lobbying pressure for "pro-majority" rules.118 The
premise that majority shareholders are likely to be residents of the incor-
porating state flows directly from the widely accepted observation that
majority shareholders often contract to control the management of the
assets. The minority interests are more likely to be passive and hence can
be more geographically dispersed. The North Carolina experience itself
might provide some support for this alternative "public choice" explana-
tion. Robert Thompson tells me that the legislature, in revising the stat-
ute, was explicitly lobbied by both majority and minority shareholders of
the closely held corporation that owns the Belk department stores.1 19
Although the minority shareholders were also in-state residents and were
sufficiently organized to do some lobbying, the majority interest not sur-
prisingly prevailed in restricting the statutory remedies available to "op-
pressed" minorities. Thus, an alternative explanation for North
117. For an important analysis of corporate statutes in this vein, see Macey & Miller, supra note
6.
118. I should stress that this very tentative hypothesis is only one of a variety of public-choice
influences that will determine the content of legislation in the absence of state competition. Local
creditors, for example also might exert concentrated lobbying efforts on issues of corporate govern-
ance. Paul Mahoney has pointed out to me that creditors' interests might be aligned with majority
shareholders in this area. The creditors' primary interest is that equity capital invested in the ven-
ture will be illiquid (at least until creditors have been paid) and thus creditors might prefer rules that
make it hard for minorities to exit.
119. Telephone conversation with Robert Thompson, Professor of Law, Washington University
(Nov. 1, 1991).
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Carolina's revision-and for the continued refusal of most states to pro-
vide for minority puts-might be the successful self-interested lobbying
of concentrated, in-state majority shareholders.12
An interesting corollary to this hypothesis applies to publicly held cor-
porations, but here the analysis is inverted. In publicly held corpora-
tions, well-organized minority blocks of shares are likely to be held by
domestic residents, and an additional influence on corporate statutes gov-
erning publicly held corporations will come through lobbying for "pro-
minority" rules. This influence will be especially felt in states that have
not joined the race for public charters. Thus in Texas, for example, well-
organized minority groups succeeded until 1967 in retaining legislative
support for a de facto merger provision that mandated an eighty percent
shareholder approval for "the sale of all or substantially all the corpora-
tion's property and assets."12 Under this provision, in-state minority
shareholders (holding at least twenty-one percent of the stock) could suc-
cessfully block out-of-state majorities from changing the corporate struc-
ture. 22 Either theory might explain the divergent treatment by courts
and legislatures of exit issues in the close corporation context. These
majority-minority hypotheses are crude public-choice theories put for-
ward here to suggest. In specific contexts other well-organized interest
groups, including debt holders of a close corporation and the corporate
bar, undoubtedly influence the legislation as well.1 23 This Article's larger
theory suggests that the failure of states to compete for close corpora-
tions' charters will lead, ceterisparibus, to greater legislative inertia. To
the extent that these two law-making institutions are maximizing incon-
sistent objectives, there will be a tendency for the courts to take advan-
tage of their greater rulemaking power. It may be that in equilibrium we
120. This theory does not explain, however, why other state statutes have not gone further and
explicitly stripped courts of any equitable power to grant minority puts.
121. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACr ANN. art. 5.10, at 400 (Comments of Bar Committee-1957 to 1979)
(West 1980). The current statute mandates that two-thirds of shareholders approve the sale. Id.
122. I would like to thank Frank Wozencraft for bringing this to my attention. Further "tests"
of the hypothesis are clearly required. Bill Carney has told me of an experience he had with the
revision of the Georgia corporation statute in which an Augusta legislator successfully lobbied to
limit the access of minority shareholders (with less than two percent of outstanding shares) to corpo-
rate information. See GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-1602(e) (Michie 1991); see generally Carney, supra
note 78, at 670-71. Shareholders with less than two percent might be in-state, but not politically
well organized.
123. The leading public-choice analysis of the determinants of state corporate statutes has been
authored by Jon Macey and Geoffrey Miller. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin
of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEx. L. REV. 347 (1991).
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see just as many instances of legislative reaction to court nullification of
close corporation statutes as in other contexts in which there is more
rigorous charter competition. Courts knowing the approximate demar-
cation between silent acceptance and legislative veto may have equal in-
centives to push the envelope of their common-law domain-even if the
size of the common-law envelope is much smaller with regard to rules
governing publicly held businesses.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have suggested that it is unlikely that state legisla-
tures will compete for close corporation charters. Structural forces tend
to tie the incorporation process to the company's principal place of busi-
ness, and the potential revenue from close corporations is relatively small
compared to that from large, publicly held corporations. The legisla-
tures' focus on attracting large corporate charters leaves the law gov-
erning close corporations as more of a backwater, in which common-law
courts are able to exercise a freer hand in shaping the law.
In the absence of direct competition for close corporation charters, leg-
islative action will be prompted by a number of factors. Legislative be-
havior might be influenced by spillover effects-that is, by the extent to
which close corporation laws affect the ability of the state to compete for
publicly held charters. Legislators might want either to force close cor-
porations to abide by public-corporation law to feed a larger (and more
valuable) precedent pool, or to force close corporations to clearly opt for
separate legal treatment to avoid the application of confusing (and there-
fore less valuable) close corporation precedents to publicly held
incorporations.
I have argued that the evolution of rules governing shareholder agree-
ments is consistent with (i.e., does not falsify) these positive theories.
Legislatures began by forcing close corporations to adopt inefficient gov-
ernance structures (and thus to pool with public corporations). Judges
then took the lead in nullifying the inefficient statutes. Legislatures re-
sponded by allowing shareholders to contract for control, but condi-
tioned this right on the corporations' clearly opting for separate
precedential treatment (thus reducing a possible negative spillover).' 24
124. The strong form of this spillover theory would predict that states would force close corpo-
rations to opt for a separate form of law. Most general corporate statutes, however, allow sharehold-
ers of close corporations to contract for control. This contractual flexibility undermines the strong
form of the spillover theory because the statutes do not require small corporations to opt for separate
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To the extent that spillover effects are small, legislators are likely to be
governed by the public-choice variables-such as the lobbying of concen-
trated interest groups-that lead theories for legislative behavior in other
contexts in which the disciplining force of competitive federalism is ab-
sent. I suggested that majority blocks of shareholders are more likely to
lobby effectively in the close corporation context and that minority
blocks of shareholders (including managers) are more likely to lobby ef-
fectively in the public-corporation setting. There is highly tentative sup-
port for this theory in North Carolina's recent repeal of the minority put
remedy for showings of oppression. Again, it is not surprising that
courts, in the absence of competitive federalism, have exercised discre-
tion in supplementing and at times supplanting statutory rules in this
area. In contrast to the matter of shareholder agreements, however, it is
more difficult to assess which institution is more often right.
A larger purpose of this Article is to suggest that an enlightened exam-
ination of the interplay between courts and legislatures can yield a wealth
of testable hypotheses. For example, the public-choice explanations of
legislative behavior are likely to have greater power with regard to the
large number of nonracing jurisdictions-for example those that have
pooled together by adopting similar versions of the Model Business Cor-
porations Act. If these states are not primarily motivated by charter rev-
enue, then we might expect to see larger effects from private-interest
lobbying-even with respect to the law governing publicly traded
corporations.
In their excellent analysis of close corporation law and economics,
Easterbrook and Fischel praise the statute-nullifying decisions in Clark,
Galler and Radom 125-yet say nothing about the race-to-the-top or com-
petitive federalism that they have extolled at length and with great ele-
gance elsewhere. 26 Given the absence of any significant charter
competition, their lack of deference for statutory efficiency is completely
appropriate. While Calabresi's central thesis is normative, his insights
suggest several falsifiable explanations for the interactions between the
judicial and legislative makers of corporate law. I suggest that focusing
statutory treatment-and indeed, few businesses opt for statutory close corporation law. See supra
text accompanying note 47. However, merely giving small corporations this option may reduce the
likelihood of judicial nullification and hence be consistent with a weaker spillover theory.
125. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 84, at 281, 286.
126. See Easterbrook, supra note 4; Fischel, supra note 6.
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on the institutional tensions provides an especially powerful lens through
which to view the efficiency of the substantive rules.
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